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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OBAMA 




SUPPORT AND DEFEND: CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 
Mark R. Shulman 
I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I 
take this obligation freely, without any mental 
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well 
and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which 
I am about to enter. So help me God.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional linchpins of human rights—most 
notably regular elections, habeas corpus, freedom of expression, 
                                                                                                                         
 Mark R. Shulman, Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs and International 
Affairs and an Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is 
grateful to Martin S. Flaherty of the Leitner Center for International Law and Justice at 
Fordham University School of Law for the opportunity to present this work at the 
symposium “Human Rights in the Obama Administration: A Midterm Report—
Successes, Challenges, Ways Forward.” This work also benefitted from discussion 
following presentations to the International Law Committee of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York (Arthur W. Rovine, Chairman) and at the symposium “A 
Decade of Transformation: The Continuing Impact of 9/11 on National Security and 
Civil Liberties” held by the Law Review at Florida Coastal School of Law. This Article 
also benefitted greatly from the skilled work of the editors of the Fordham International 
Law Journal as well as from the input of his Pace colleagues Bridget Crawford, Marie S. 
Newman, Taryn L. Rucinski, Braden E. Smith, and Deborah W. Zipf.  
1. Oath of Office, 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). 
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and civilian control of the military—ensure that the people 
remain sovereign in a democratic society by allowing them to 
hold governments accountable. These instruments work to 
prevent arbitrariness in government. They enable the people to 
speak and ensure that their leaders will hear. They imply too 
that the government will respond appropriately with remedies 
for valid complaints. Without any one of these constitutional 
linchpins, substantive human rights could not be enforced. In 
such circumstances, governments may still recognize the claims 
of individuals—but only by grace, not by right. 
Each of these relational elements is necessary to ensure that 
human rights are protected.2 The significance of each particular 
element has been examined at length. For instance, much has 
been written about the critical roles that regular elections and 
the freedom of expression play in promoting responsive 
government. Likewise, the US policies and practices for 
detaining alleged terrorists have, over the past ten years, given 
the study of habeas corpus a tremendous boost. But, the fourth 
element, civilian control of the military, remains less developed.3 
This Article explores civil-military relations in the United States 
and their connection to human rights, taking a pair of 
important new books as a prompt and a springboard for further 
exploration.  
This Article starts out by explaining why robust civil-military 
relations matter. Without meaningful and reliable civilian 
                                                                                                                         
2. The US National Security Strategy articulates a similar list in explaining the 
importance of promoting democracy abroad by working to strengthen “key institutions 
of democratic accountability—free and fair electoral processes, strong legislatures, 
civilian control of militaries, honest police forces, independent and fair judiciaries, a 
free and independent press, a vibrant private sector, and a robust civil society.” THE 
WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
37 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf. 
3. Surprisingly few scholars have attempted significant studies of the civil-military 
relationship in the United States. To the author’s knowledge, no one has completed a 
more thorough examination of civil-military relations since Samuel P. Huntington 
published his magisterial work, The Soldier and the State, in 1957. SAMUEL P. 
HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS (Vintage Books 1964) (1957); see Deborah N. Pearlstein, The 
Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(providing an extensive review of the literature and analyzing the ways in which 
professional military advice does, does not, and can better conform to separation of 
powers theory).  
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control of the military, governments lose some measure of 
control over the destiny of their nation. In extreme 
circumstances it can even lead an overthrow of government. Part 
I discusses A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make 
Our Military Stronger by law professor Diane Mazur, a new book 
that examines recent civil-military relations in the United States. 
Her carefully constructed work maintains that since the Vietnam 
era, the United States Supreme Court has hewn the armed 
forces from general society in order to create a separate—and 
more socially conservative—sphere. Part II discusses The Decline 
and Fall of the American Republic by constitutional scholar Bruce 
Ackerman, a wise and wide-ranging book that argues that the 
nation’s polity is in decline and that the increasingly politicized 
armed forces may ultimately lead to a coup. Part III asks where 
we go from here. The important books under discussion 
attribute a thinning of the civilian control over the military to 
legal and political decisions made over the past thirty years. 
They explain some of the most critical implications of this 
transformation and they offer sensible proposals about how to 
improve that critical relationship for the sake of enhancing the 
effectiveness of our armed forces and the vitality of our republic. 
But, neither work examines the evolving nature of great power 
politics since the end of the Cold War, the effects new 
technologies have on long-standing distinctions and borders, or 
the relative rise of nonstate actors including Al Qaeda—three 
sets of exogenous factors that inevitably drive changes in the 
civil-military relationship. So in the end, these books point to a 
more ambitious enterprise, reexamining the relationship 
between force and twenty-first century society. 
The remarkable events of the Arab Spring in 2011 
illuminate important truths about the nature of governments 
and governance. Most notably, in order to rule, civilian 
leadership must exercise consistent and reliable control over the 
state’s security apparatus. In the case of repressive regimes, 
stability may not be normatively desirable, but it remains 
significant nonetheless. Without the ability to control the army, 
almost any regime will fall. This lesson may seem obvious or 
axiomatic, but it bears repeating and illustrating. The Tunisian 
military’s refusal to support the long-standing regime in the face 
of a popular uprising condemned President Zine El Abidine 
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Ben Ali to a rapid fall from power.4 Shortly thereafter, the world 
watched anxiously to see whether the Egyptian military would 
remain loyal to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak or shift 
the balance of power to the protesters crowding Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square. Much like their counterparts in Tunisia, the Egyptian 
military tried to play the role of an honest broker, effectively 
denying support to the president and thus ensuring the 
protesters the space in which to give effect to their revolution.5 
Months after Mubarak fled Cairo, the military continues to 
exercise power, running the interim government.6 In contrast, 
the armed forces of Bahrain and Syria have thus far remained 
mostly obedient to their governments, which in turn have, to 
date, survived.7 The case of Libya illustrates a third way. The 
Libyan military split on supporting the regime of Muammar 
Muhammad el-Qaddafi, resulting in a bitter and protracted civil 
war.8 In every instance where the military has fully supported the 
government, the government survived. Where the military 
turned against the national leadership, the governments fell. 
And where the military has vacillated, violent conflict and 
political indeterminacy ensued. 
These examples demonstrate several elemental points. 
Civilian control of the military is not necessarily binary. When a 
nation’s armed forces take orders from the civilian leadership, 
the government has a good chance of retaining power. When 
the military is not absolutely obedient, the regime’s ability to 
govern is significantly diminished. When the military defects, a 
change in leadership invariably results. The events of the Arab 
Spring offer a timely and poignant reminder of a role that 
armed forces play in the life and death of a state—a role 
generally downplayed, but nevertheless very real in the United 
                                                                                                                         
4. See David Kirkpatrick, Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2011, at A4; Ousted Tunisian Strongman Convicted of Corruption Charges, CNN, June 20, 
2011, http://articles.cnn.com/ 2011-06-20/world/tunisia.ben.ali_1_corruption-charges-
abidine-ben-ali-tunisians?_s=PM:WORLD. 
5. See, e.g., Larisa Epatko, What is the Role of the Military in Egypt’s Transition?, THE 
RUNDOWN, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2011 3:00 PM), http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/
rundown/2011/02/egypt-military.html. 
6. See David Kirkpatrick, Military Flexes Its Muscles as Islamists Gain in Egypt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A6. 
7. See, e.g., Zoltan Barany, The Role of the Military, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 24, 31–34 
(2011). 
8. See, e.g., id. at 28–31. 
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States. When the government does not exercise a monopoly on 
the use of large-scale violence, the regime’s effectiveness and 
longevity becomes less certain. This lesson might seem self-
evident, but it is worth spelling out because of its momentous 
implications. 
Of course, the Arab Spring examples have significant 
limitations in their heuristic value for a study of the United 
States. The affected countries were not functional democracies 
with robust rule of law systems and traditions of ordered liberty. 
They were run by people who had risen through the military or 
taken power through military means. Their institutions of civil 
society were meager. Their cultures were imbued with 
discontent, particularly among the vast portion of society that is 
young and under- or unemployed. The armed forces themselves 
were more oriented toward state security roles than those of war-
fighting. This orientation may have made the military more 
likely to make autonomous decisions about whether to support 
their governments. In all these ways and more, the countries 
directly affected by the Arab Spring differ significantly from the 
United States. Nevertheless, the basic point remains valid: if a 
country’s leadership cannot rely on the military for complete 
and unfailing support of its policies, then the range of policies 
its political leaders can pursue is limited by the military and not 
by political leadership. 
Effective civilian control of the military, therefore, is an 
unheralded linchpin of human rights. Just as an actual linchpin 
secures a wheel to the axle, civilian control of the military 
ensures that the armed forces do not spin off or diverge from 
the policies of the elected leadership. Military officers in the 
United States take an oath of office to support and defend the 
Constitution.9 That oath articulates and embodies the principal 
obligations of officers. Without the loyalty commanded by that 
oath, the rights of civilians are not fully guaranteed, even 
though they may be more or less respected as a matter of policy 
or habit. Therefore, civilian control is necessary to: (1) ensure 
representative government and consequently almost every other 
                                                                                                                         
9. Oath of Office, 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). The oath taken by National Guard 
officers also includes support and defense of the state’s constitution and obedience to 
its governor. Appointment Oath, 32 U.S.C. § 312 (2006). 
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human right; (2) prevent militarization of civil society and the 
civilianization of the military; and (3) ensure effective barriers 
between the law, norms and privileges of war and those of civil 
society. 
The 2011 US National Military Strategy provides a crisp 
statement of the American tradition of civilian control over the 
military and its immediate implications: 
We [the Joint Forces] will maintain the trust and confidence 
of our elected leaders and the public by providing frank, 
professional military advice; being good stewards of public 
resources; and vigorously executing lawful orders. The 
military’s adherence to the ideals comprised in our 
Constitution is a profound example for other nations. We 
will continue to affirm the foundational values in our oath: 
civilian control of the military remains a core principle of 
our Republic and we will preserve it. We will remain an 
apolitical institution and sustain this position at all costs.10 
Inclusion of this statement represents a welcome change from 
the previous National Military Strategy, from which it was 
absent.11 
To bring the point home, Admiral Michael Mullen, retiring 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs, recently explained this principle to 
a new generation of officers, notably at the Class of 2011 
Commencement ceremony at the US Military Academy at West 
Point. 
I’m going to ask you to remember that you are citizens first 
and foremost. This great republic of ours was founded on 
some pretty simple ideas—simple but enduring. And one of 
them is that the people, through their elected 
representatives, will, as the Constitution stipulates, raise an 
army and maintain a navy. The people will determine the 
course the military steers, the skills we perfect, the wars we 
fight. The people reign supreme. We answer to them. We 
                                                                                                                         
10. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2011: REDEFINING AMERICA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
16 (2011), available at http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_
2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.  
11. Compare Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, id., with Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A 
Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (2004), available at http://www.jcs.mil//
content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf. 
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are therefore—and must remain—a neutral instrument of 
the state, accountable to our civilian leaders no matter 
which political party holds sway.12 
Admiral Mullen’s account is indisputable and notable because 
he included it in his valedictory commencement address.13 Why 
did he feel compelled to remind the cadets that they remain 
citizens and that they must serve as neutral instruments of state? 
What factors moved him to speak these most fundamental 
concepts as if they were a request? Constitutional law scholars 
Diane H. Mazur and Bruce Ackerman provide some answers to 
these questions in their recent books.  
I. A SEPARATE SPHERE 
Diane H. Mazur is one of the rare women who has served as 
a military officer and then gone on to teach full-time in an 
American law school.14 As a young Air Force captain, she had 
served as an aircraft-maintenance and then a munitions-
maintenance officer before attending law school. Following 
graduation, she practiced law for a few years and then joined the 
faculty of the University of Florida Levin College of Law. Since 
the mid-nineties, Mazur has written extensively on civil-military 
relations, focusing particularly on issues related to sexual 
minorities in the military and the related “Don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy controversies. She has also written a number of policy 
                                                                                                                         
12. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Commencement Address at the US Military Academy (May 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1598. 
13. For other examples of this kind of high-profile reminder, see Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates’ admonition that “[a]s officers, you will have a responsibility 
to communicate to those below you that the American military must be non-political,” 
which was delivered in graduation speeches at the US Naval Academy (Annapolis) on 
May 25, 2007 and the US Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs) on May 30, 2007. 
Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Commencement Address at the US Naval Academy 
(May 25, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=
1154; Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Commencement Address at the US Air Force 
Academy (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1157; see also Admiral Michael Mullen, From the Chairman: 
Military Must Stay Apolitical, 50 JOINT FORCES Q. 2, 2 (2008) (reminding the members of 
the armed services to remain apolitical in an essay published during the 2008 US 
presidential campaign). 
14 . See Faculty & Staff: Diane H. Mazur, UNIV. FLA. LEVIN C. L., 
http://www.law.ufl.edu/ faculty/ mazur/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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studies for the Palm Center, a research institute focusing on 
gender, sexuality, and the military, where she serves as Legal Co-
Director. Her new book, A More Perfect Military: How the 
Constitution Can Make Our Military Stronger, brings together a 
career’s worth of military, scholarly, and advocacy work into one 
powerful argument. 
The title of this book plays nicely on the Preamble of the 
US Constitution to convey the thesis that “the military is most 
healthy when it respects constitutional values.”15 Mazur argues 
that “[u]nfortunately, since the end of the Vietnam draft, our 
civilian branches of government—the president, Congress, and 
the courts—have been trying to distance the military from the 
Constitution. They assume that constitutional values get in the 
way of military effectiveness, but that’s not true.”16 Mazur sets 
out to cut through the cant and “change all the rules that limit 
the way we talk about the military.”17 Unlike Bruce Ackerman, 
whose work will be discussed below, Mazur does not focus on the 
constitutional implications of the strained civil-military 
relationship. Recognizing the same general phenomenon, 
Ackerman argues that it might lead to some sort of military 
intervention or coup in the United States. Mazur goes in a 
different direction. She believes that our “confidence that the 
military will never engage in a coup against civilian government, 
or anything even remotely close to a coup” should not confuse 
us into believing that civil-military relations are good.18 Mazur 
believes that Congress and especially the judiciary have been too 
active, to the detriment of civil-military relations and, ultimately, 
to the vibrancy of the armed forces. Mazur’s book argues for 
tearing down the wall that segregates the armed forces from the 
rest of society. These acts of creative destruction will, she argues, 
endow the nation with a more robust force, one more capable of 
                                                                                                                         
15. Interview by Michael F. Shaughnessy with Diane H. Mazur, author, TOWARDS A 
MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 
(Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.educationnews.org/commentaries/
102607.html. 
16. Id. 
17. DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN 
MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 5 (2010). 
18. Id. at 13. 
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defending the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic.19 
At the heart of Mazur’s book is the claim that over the past 
four decades, conservative lawmakers and judges have carved 
out a separate sphere for the military. In it, they have promoted 
conservative social values without heed to the modern 
constitutional protections for individuals. And to insulate the 
armed forces from the social progress that has been 
transforming civilian society, they have created strong rhetorical 
and legal barriers that prevent the questioning of military 
choices. To make this argument, Mazur draws widely on recent 
American history, including such notable episodes as the 
Tailhook Scandal, the formation of the “Don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy, and the abuses at Abu Ghraib.20 But most critically and 
innovatively, she examines a strand of the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence of William Rehnquist. 21  Mazur argues that 
Rehnquist created circumstances in which “military society 
could serve as a safe harbor from the usual constitutional 
expectations . . . [and] could be used to validate and reinforce 
socially conservative viewpoints.” 22  Rehnquist revolutionized 
American civil-military relations for the purpose of promoting 
his conservative social values. 
Mazur’s story opens with Rehnquist as a recent Stanford 
Law School graduate clerking for Justice Robert H. Jackson. The 
Supreme Court heard Orloff v. Willoughby, a low-profile case 
about a doctor challenging the army’s decisions to draft him 
under the Doctors’ Draft Act and then not to commission him as 
a medical officer, presumably because of his unwillingness to 
deny that he was a Communist.23 Orloff had argued that because 
he could only be drafted on account of his being a doctor, then 
the army must either commission him as a medical officer or 
discharge him. 
The Supreme Court held otherwise, ruling for the army. 
Justice Jackson wrote: 
                                                                                                                         
19. See generally id. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 120–26, 146–64, 174–80. 
21. See generally id. at 53–73. 
22. Id. at 88. 
23. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 91 (1953); see MAZUR, supra note 17, at 42–
45. 
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We know that from top to bottom of the Army the 
complaint is often made, and sometimes with justification, 
that there is discrimination, favoritism or other 
objectionable handling of men. But judges are not given the 
task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up 
channels through which such grievances can be considered 
and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the 
President of the United States and his subordinates. The 
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government 
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere 
with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be 
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.24 
Mazur agrees with the decision to uphold the army’s authority to 
self-regulate and speculates that Rehnquist may have even 
drafted this key passage of the decision.25 After all, we know that 
young Rehnquist had drafted a memo to Justice Jackson then 
considering Brown v. Board of Education that “Plessy v. Ferguson 
was right and should be re-affirmed.”26 Clearly he was willing to 
share his conservative views with Justice Jackson, intending to 
see them written into the court’s opinions. Moreover, he was 
“preoccupied with the question of the judiciary’s proper posture 
towards the military.”27 In any case, the Korean War-era Orloff 
decision took on a life of its own during the more politically 
contentious war that followed. 
Once on the court himself, Justice Rehnquist sought “to 
push the military outside our nation’s constitutional fold and 
weaken its connection to civilian courts and civilian law” in a 
pair of early cases dealing with some of the day’s most hotly 
debated issues.28 In late October 1969, John Flower was ordered 
                                                                                                                         
24. Orloff, 343 U.S. at 93–94 (emphasis added) (noting that the military are 
governed by military law and military justice—a separate system of order and 
discipline—but not that it constitutes a separate society). 
25. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 42. 
26 . William H. Rehnquist, A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases 2, in 
NOMINATION OF JUSTICE WILLIAM HUBBS REHNQUIST: HEARINGS BEFORE THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong. 315 (1986), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh99-1067/browse.html. 
27. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 45 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of 
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1986)). 
28. Id. 
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off Fort Sam Houston for distributing anti-war flyers.29 Six weeks 
later he returned and was arrested for being on an otherwise 
open military post and for “distributing handbill invitations for a 
‘Town meeting’ on the Vietnam War.”30 The District Court 
convicted Flower of unlawfully entering military property and 
sentenced him to six months in prison.31 The Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction, holding that “[o]ne who is rightfully 
on a street which the state has left open to the public carries 
with him there as elsewhere, the constitutional right to express 
his views in an orderly fashion.”32 Joined by Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, Rehnquist dissented: 
Simply because some activities and individuals are allowed 
on government property does not require the abandonment 
of otherwise allowable restrictions on its use. . . .[T]he 
unique requirements of military morale and security may 
well necessitate control over certain persons and activities 
on the base, even while normal traffic flow through the area 
can be tolerated.33 
Whereas governmental decisions to limit free speech would 
usually be subject to strict scrutiny, Rehnquist would not even 
inquire into the legitimacy of those restrictions when applied by 
the army. He would not ask for—let alone weigh—their burdens 
against the benefits to morale and security. He would defer 
unquestioningly to the military’s decision.34 
The young justice extended this logic two years later in a 
more high-profile equal protection case, Frontiero v. Richardson.35 
In this case, Air Force Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero challenged 
the military’s policy of giving all married men extra housing and 
medical benefits while requiring married women seeking these 
                                                                                                                         
29. See Flower v. United States, 452 F.2d 80, 81–82 (5th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 407 U.S. 
197 (1972). 
30. Id. at 82; MAZUR, supra note 17, at 46. 
31. Flower, 452 F.2d at 91. Flower was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1382: “Whoever 
reenters or is found [within a military post] after having been removed therefrom or 
ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof—Shall 
be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.” Id. at 
87 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Flower, 407 U.S. at 198–99 (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 
(1943)). 
33. Id. at 200–01 (citations omitted). 
34. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 47. 
35. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see MAZUR, supra note 17, at 49. 
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benefits to prove that their husbands were dependent upon 
them.36 In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the 
court held that classifications based on sex should be subject to 
strict scrutiny. He found that the Air Force’s rationale for this 
differential treatment, which rested on “administrative 
convenience,” could not stand up to such scrutiny.37 In Justice 
Brennan’s trenchant words, there “can be no doubt that 
‘administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth, the mere 
recitation of which dictates constitutionality.” 38  Quietly 
endorsing the opinion below, Rehnquist dissented from 
Brennan’s opinion elevating distinctions based on sex to the 
same protected status as race, alienage, and national origin.39 So, 
“in determining the constitutionality of the statutory scheme 
which plaintiffs attack, [he would merely] ask whether the 
classification established in the legislation is reasonable and not 
arbitrary and whether there is a rational connection between the 
classification and a legitimate governmental end.” 40  Mazur 
attributes this position to Rehnquist’s willingness to make 
Frontiero prove that the claim of administrative convenience by 
the US Department of Defense did not exist.41 Here the record 
is very thin;42 perhaps Rehnquist took this position because of an 
unwillingness to elevate the level of scrutiny for sex-based 
distinctions rather than out of deference to the military. 
If Rehnquist spoke sotto voce in Frontiero, he came out 
roaring in three landmark cases that followed the end of military 
conscription in 1973: Parker v. Levy in 1974, Rostker v. Goldberg in 
1981, and Goldman v. Weinberger in 1986.43 With these three 
decisions, Rehnquist led the charge to revolutionize the 
relationship between military and civilian society.44 According to 
Mazur, his “opinions would build [a] wedge on a foundation of 
                                                                                                                         
36. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680–81; MAZUR, supra note 17, at 48. 
37. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688, 690–91. 
38. Id. at 690. 
39. Id. at 691. 
40. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206 (M.D. Ala. 1972).  
41. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 48–49. 
42. Rehnquist did not actually draft a dissenting opinion. The syllabus merely 
notes that he dissented by simply endorsing “the reasons stated by Judge [Richard] 
Rives in his opinion for the District Court.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691. 
43. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
44. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 55–56. 
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four troubling principles” that have come increasingly to define 
the civil-military relationship in today’s United States.45 
The military should be portrayed as distant, remote, and 
separate from civilian society. The more different the 
military is from the civilian society it serves, the less 
justification there might be for holding the military to the 
expectations of civilian law. 
The military should be viewed as morally superior to civilian 
society and civilian government, and military values should 
be elevated above constitutional values. If military values 
were morally superior to constitutional values, it would be 
much easier to disregard the Constitution when its 
protections appeared to conflict with assertions of military 
necessity. 
Civilians should be encouraged to withdraw from active 
participation in civil-military relations and civilian control of 
the military and to see themselves as unqualified and 
undeserving to question assertions of military necessity. 
Service members should be encouraged to resent civilians, 
civilian society, and civilian influence over the military. 
Judges, courts, and other institutions of law should be 
reluctant to insert themselves in legal controversies 
involving the military, creating a vacuum that could be filled 
by political partisanship and allegiance.46 
Mazur argues that all this has come to pass with harmful effects 
on the military and the republic. To make this argument, she 
offers a provocative account of the Supreme Court decisions. 
Rehnquist launched this revolution in Parker v. Levy, which 
ought to have been a simple case. In 1966, the “Hawkeye Pierce” 
of the Vietnam War, Army Captain Howard Levy, started to tell 
lower-ranking personnel that the war was immoral and that 
black soldiers were being discriminated against by being “given 
all the hazardous duty . . . [and that if he] were a colored soldier 
[he] would refuse to go to Viet Nam and . . . refuse to fight.”47 
Not surprisingly, Levy was court-martialed and convicted of 
conduct unbecoming an officer and for acts that “prejudice . . . 
                                                                                                                         
45. Id. at 56. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 57 (citing to Levy’s public statement noted in Parker, 417 U.S. at 737). 
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good order and discipline in the armed forces.”48 Nor was it 
remarkable that the Supreme Court upheld the convictions, 
finding that the charged provisions of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice were neither unconstitutionally vague nor 
overbroad. 
The important part of the Parker v. Levy story that Mazur 
reveals is how Rehnquist misrepresented the earlier Orloff 
decision to establish the proposition “that the military should be 
seen as distant, remote, and separate from civilian society.”49 To 
do so, he mischaracterized Justice Jackson’s dicta discussed 
briefly above: “The military constitutes a specialized community 
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”50 
Jackson had been referring to the military justice system, but 
Rehnquist twisted the words to imply that the military was 
necessarily a society separate and apart from civilian society.51 
He offered what became a self-fulfilling argument. The military 
in which Captain Levy served had been highly representative of 
American society in general. Soldiers were not relegated to 
lifetimes on remote outposts on the frontier as they had been in 
the century preceding World War II. Instead, conscripts and 
career soldiers lived within American society. And until the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Parker v. Levy in 
1974, America’s soldiers generally enjoyed all of the freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment without admonishment 
that the exercise of those freedoms was inconsistent with good 
order and discipline.52 The Parker decision started a process of 
walling the armed forces off from the rest of American society.  
In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg, Justice Rehnquist 
found his opportunity to harden the wall he was drawing around 
the military. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter responded to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by reinstating the draft 
registration. Contrary to the president’s wish to register women 
as well, Congress authorized funds sufficient only to register 
                                                                                                                         
48. Parker, 417 U.S. at 736, 738. 
49. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 59. 
50. Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)). 
51. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 59; see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 744–45. 
52. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 60–61. 
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eligible men.53 The Goldberg plaintiffs complained that the 
process violated the equal protection guarantees of men and 
women.54 Mazur explains that the Court should have found 
Goldberg a difficult case for introducing heightened deference to 
military decision making.55 First, unlike previous cases that had 
generally decided the claims of one person or a small number of 
people, this case affected all American women between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-six. Second, previous cases involved 
review of decisions made by the military; here, Goldberg was 
challenging a congressional decision. And third, in previous 
cases the Court had decided to defer to the military. In this case, 
the military services had requested funds to register women too; 
it was Congress that refused to make the authorization. 
Nonetheless, Rehnquist wrote that “the Constitution itself 
requires . . . deference to congressional choice.”56 Mazur argues 
that Rehnquist deferred to the will of Congress over that of the 
military on this military personnel issue because Congress was 
seeking to implement its view about the proper role for women 
in society.57 This is vexing because in the rest of society, the 
Court specifically does not defer to discrimination based on sex. 
Rather it ruled such distinctions as presumptively unlawful.58 
With the ruling in Goldberg, Rehnquist was able to promote a 
social agenda that used the military as the means to achieve a 
non-military end. When the military wanted to discriminate in 
ways that promoted conservative social values, the Rehnquist 
Court deferred to the military. When Congress wanted to use 
the military to discriminate, Rehnquist would lead the Court to 
defer to Congress, even against the Defense Department’s 
opposition. 
In the final case of this post-draft trilogy, Goldman v. 
Weinberger, Rehnquist capped off his wall.59 S. Simcha Goldman 
                                                                                                                         
53. See Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (July 2, 1980); see also Doug 
Bandow, Draft Registration: The Politics of Institutional Immortality, CATO (Aug. 15, 1994), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-214.html#3a. 
54. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981); see also MAZUR, supra note 17, 
at 62. 
55. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 64–65. 
56. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67. 
57. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 68. 
58. See id. at 66. 
59. See generally Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
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was a clinical psychologist serving as an air force officer. As an 
orthodox rabbi, his faith required him to cover his head. After 
his superior officer ordered him to remove his yarmulke, 
Captain Goldman sued, claiming that this interpretation of the 
uniform rule unduly infringed on his right to religious 
expression.60 In this decision, Justice Rehnquist summed up his 
decades of work. 
In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether 
military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously 
motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the 
professional judgment of military authorities concerning 
the relative importance of a particular military interest . . . . 
Not only are courts “ill-equipped to determine the impact 
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military 
authority might have” but the military authorities have been 
charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with 
carrying out our Nation’s military policy.61 
The air force did not have to explain its policy, let alone 
justify it. Nor was this a question of deference to congressional 
will; the air force had simply issued and interpreted its own 
regulation without the notice and comment that other 
governmental agencies must undergo prior to issuing 
regulations. Captain Goldman had either to remove his 
yarmulke or leave the service just as every other orthodox Jew 
and Sikh in the service would have to do. Rehnquist’s revolution 
was complete. No longer would the personnel policies of the 
armed forces of the United States be subjected to any 
meaningful constitutional review. He had separated military 
society from civil society and from constitutionally protected 
rights. Mazur argues that in this separate sphere, conservatives 
proceeded to institutionalize their prejudices about 
homosexuals, 62  women, 63  religious minorities, 64  and even law 
                                                                                                                         
60. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504–05 (quoting the Air Force regulation, AFR 35-10, 
¶ 1-6.h(2)(f) (1980), which said that “headgear will not be worn . . . [w]hile indoors 
except by armed security police in the performance of their duties”); MAZUR, supra 
note 17, at 69–72. 
61. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
62. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 146–54. 
63. See id. at 165–80. 
64. See id. at 69–73. 
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students 65  in ways that make the military less strong 66  and 
America less equitable. 
Separate is seldom equal. As noted above, Mazur’s work 
strongly emphasizes the role that Justice Rehnquist and the 
Supreme Court played in the separation of military personnel 
from American society. 67  Having established that claim, she 
moves on to argue that Rehnquist’s views about the separate 
nature of the armed services—while not necessarily accurate 
when he penned them—became self-fulfilling.68 Ten years after 
the Goldman decision, a former vice chief of naval operations 
observed, “the armed forces are no longer representative of the 
people they serve. More and more, enlisted [men and women] 
as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, 
better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an 
                                                                                                                         
65. See id. at 6–9. Mazur explains that ROTC programs left many university 
campuses because they would not comply with academic standards and because the 
end of the selective service made ROTC less popular, not, as was commonly held, 
because of any hostility on the part of elite universities. The inaccurate but prevailing 
story fed an unwarranted sense that military people were unwelcome in wider society. 
Id. Similarly, she argues that Congress’ threats to cut funding to higher education 
institutions that prohibit ROTC or prevent or military recruitment on campus, 
otherwise known as the Solomon Amendment controversies, unnecessarily exacerbated 
a minor issue. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), 547 
U.S. 47, 51–53 (2006). The military should not have discriminated against homosexuals 
in service. Law schools should not have banned military recruiters. Congress should not 
have retaliated with the Solomon Amendment threatening to cut off all government 
support of the universities. And law professors should have realized that their case to 
overturn the Solomon Amendment would not succeed because the Supreme Court 
would view it as a military personnel issue, not a free speech issue. See generally Rumsfeld, 
547 U.S. 47. Mazur argues that the ROTC and the Solomon Amendment controversies 
arose because the Supreme Court had deprived members of the armed forces of 
freedoms enjoyed by a more tolerant civil society. See generally MAZUR, supra note 17, 
ch. 1. 
66. See generally MAZUR, supra note 17, at ch. 8. Mazur ascribes one important 
facet of the military’s fragility as arising out its unwillingness to draw from a broader 
swath of society, posing significant constraints on its ability to recruit and retain 
suitable candidates. As one result of this situation, she argue, the military ends up 
overpaying enlisted personnel. See id. at 140–43. Even so, the services are taking in a 
declining rate of high-school graduates and an increasing number of recruits requiring 
“moral waivers” on account of their records of felony and serious misdemeanor 
convictions. The services have had to issue thousands of these waivers, including for 
persons convicted of “aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, and in a few cases, for 
making terrorist threats.” Id. at 138–39. The services have also been recruiting more 
former gang members. See id. at 139–40. 
67. See, e.g., id. at 89–91; see also supra notes 20–57 and accompanying text. 
68. See id. at 90. See generally id. at ch.6.  
426 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:409 
armed force serving a democracy.”69 This sense of superiority 
reached something like a crisis level in the late 1990s. Since the 
war in Afghanistan started in late 2001, the crisis has greatly 
dissipated, even if the sense of separation and superiority has 
not. Mazur argues that this separate sphere gives the 
government innumerable opportunities for mischief, and space 
in which to employ questionable policies, most notably in the 
detention, interrogation, and trial of person considered 
dangerous in the so-called “War on Terror.” 70  As will be 
discussed below, Bruce Ackerman argues that a constitutional 
crisis may yet reemerge with even more far-reaching 
consequences.71 
The “military is the most respected and trusted institution, 
public or private, 72  within our society,” 73  and our elected 
representatives are not. Ackerman and Mazur explore some of 
the implications. Mazur argues that this fact may explain 
support for military detention and trials of accused terrorists. 
And Ackerman speculates that it may put the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs in the position of deciding to end a contested 
                                                                                                                         
69. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 77 (quoting Stanley R. Arthur, The American 
Military: Some Thoughts on Who We Are and What We Are, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
AND THE NOT-QUITE WARS OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 15 (Vincent Davis ed., 1996)). 
70. See MAZUR, supra note 17, ch. 7. 
71. See infra Part III. 
72. See, e.g., Donna Miles, Military Takes Top U.S. Confidence Rankings, AM. FORCES 
PRESS SERVICE (June 28, 2011), http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=641. The 
Department of Defense reports these findings proudly and without editorial comment 
on the Chairman’s webpage:  
Forty-seven percent said they have a “great deal” of confidence in the 
military, the highest rating, and 31 percent reported “quite a lot” of 
confidence. That [total] rating [of 78%] was 14 percent higher than for the 
second-ranking institution, small business, and 22 percent higher than for the 
third-ranking institution, the police. Other organizations rankings, in 
descending order of high confidence, were: organized religion, 48 percent; 
the medical system, 39 percent; the U.S. Supreme Court, 37 percent; the 
presidency, 35 percent; the public schools, 34 percent; the criminal justice 
system, 28 percent; newspapers, 28 percent; television news, 27 percent; 
banks, 23 percent; organized labor, 21 percent; big business, 19 percent; and 
health maintenance organizations, 19 percent. Congress received the lowest 
high-confidence ranking, at 12 percent. 
Id.  
73. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 3–4 (citing Frank Newport, Americans’ Confidence 
in Congress at All-Time Low, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, June 21, 2007, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27946/americans-confidence-congress-alltime-low.aspx.  
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election and placing the Republican candidate in the White 
House.  
II. THE SOLDIER AND THE REPUBLIC 
Let us turn now to a more wide-ranging book, which also 
inquires how the people of the United States relate to the 
military sworn to support and defend their Constitution. In 
Mazur’s piece, the military is framed as playing an oddly passive 
role in a campaign by social conservatives to carve out a separate 
sphere. Bruce Ackerman’s book posits that military leaders play 
a more active role in reshaping the American political order. His 
account ascribes to the armed forces a role that is less central to 
the narrative, but more decisive in the outcome. Ackerman is a 
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University, 
one of Yale’s most distinguished chairs. He earned this honor in 
great part because of his prolific record of high-impact 
scholarship, having written dozens of books and articles on 
economic and civil rights, constitutionalism, and jurisprudence, 
and more recently on national security. 74  Drawing on this 
extensive background, Ackerman delivered the prestigious 2010 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University and 
later published these lectures as The Decline and Fall of the 
American Republic.75 
The book’s title, of course, echoes the tropes made famous 
by the works of two British historians: The History of the Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire, the eighteenth-century classic by 
Edward Gibbon, and the “Rise and Fall” discourse so famously 
articulated by Ackerman’s colleague at Yale, historian Paul 
Kennedy. 76  Both historical discourses are sophisticated, 
nuanced, and ultimately pessimistic: ending with a fall. Gibbon’s 
classic attributed the decline and fall of the Roman Empire to its 
                                                                                                                         
74 . See Bruce Ackerman, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/
BAckerman.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
75 . BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(2010). 
76. See 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE (J.B. Bury ed., Fred de Fau & Co. 1906) (1789); PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE 
AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY (Ashfield Press 1986) (1976) [hereinafter 
KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY]; see also PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 
(Vintage Books 1989) (1987) [hereinafter KENNEDY, GREAT POWERS]. 
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decadent civil society and poor leadership, which off-loaded 
responsibility for the defense of the realm to mercenaries: 
That public virtue which among the ancients was 
denominated patriotism, is derived from a strong sense of 
our own interest in the preservation and prosperity of the 
free government of which we are members. Such a 
sentiment, which had rendered the legions of the republic 
almost invincible, could make but a very feeble impression 
on the mercenary servants of a despotic prince; and it 
became necessary to supply that defect by other motives, of 
a different, but not less forcible nature, honour and 
religion.77 
The mercenaries eventually turned on Rome, Gibbon explained, 
destroying the world’s greatest power and condemning Europe 
to centuries of darkness. While drawn from immense 
scholarship, Gibbon’s history was also shaped by the urgent 
issues of the time in which it was written. At this time the 
American Revolution raged and London relied increasingly on 
Hessian mercenaries in the long struggle to retain the North 
American colonies.78 To some extent, Gibbon’s history of Rome 
naturally reflected his views on the state of the British Empire as 
well. 
Two hundred years later, Britain had lost a second empire. 
Born in 1945 and writing some forty years after that, British-born 
historian Paul Kennedy posited that great empires eventually 
overreach and consequently collapse under the unbearable 
combined weight of far-flung military obligations and 
unsustainable domestic consumption. 79  For Kennedy, as for 
Gibbon, the responsibility for a great power’s decline typically 
lies in ill-considered grand strategy, or, more specifically, 
because a society’s leaders fail to make tough choices necessary 
                                                                                                                         
77. GIBBON, supra note 76, at 10. 
78. See Harold E. Selesky, Colonial America, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON 
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 79, 80 (Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos & 
Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994). 
79. See KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, supra note 76, at 347–49 (attributing 
the decline of the British Empire to its having “numerous defence burdens and 
obligations, without the corresponding capacity to sustain them”); KENNEDY, GREAT 
POWERS, supra note 76, at 44–55 (accrediting the decline of the Hapsburg Empire to 
increasing military costs, over-extension of the military, and failure to preserve the 
domestic economy). 
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for allocating resources to sustain vital institutions.80 “Rise and 
Fall” studies inevitably pair the vigor of societies with the extent 
to which their leaders’ decisions are virtuous. These studies 
exhibit an essentially historicist way of explaining the world, 
focusing on where things went wrong and how conscious (and 
contingent) human decisions shaped destiny. Many other 
scholars would attribute national or imperial decline to 
exogenous factors, such as ill-tempered gods, uncontrollable 
plagues, drinking water pipes made of deadly lead, or foreign 
invaders led by generals of unique genius.81 But for members of 
the “School of Decline,” the fault lies not in our starts but in 
ourselves. 
Applying this formula to examine the troubles of today’s 
great power, 82  Ackerman argues that the United States has 
started its decline, and that it will fall. Whereas for Kennedy, the 
word “fall” signifies a relative loss of economic and military 
power, for Ackerman it means a loss of a republic’s virtue—the 
demise of the very characteristic that defines the society, gives it 
integrity, and makes it strong. Ackerman grimly predicts in one 
breathless paragraph: 
(1) [T]he evolving system of presidential nominations will 
lead to the election of an increasing number of charismatic 
outsider types who gain office by mobilizing activist support 
for extremist programs of the left or right; (2) all 
presidents, whether extremist or mainstream, will rely on 
media consultants to design streams of sound bites aimed at 
narrowly segmented micropublics, generating a politics of 
unreason that will often dominate public debate; (3) they 
                                                                                                                         
80. See KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, supra note 76, at xiv–xvii; KENNEDY, 
GREAT POWERS, supra note 76, at xv, 539–40. 
81. See, e.g., Sergio Sabbanti & Sirio Fiorino, The Antonine Plague and the Decline of 
the Roman Empire, 17 INFEZ MED 261 (2009) (discussing the plague’s impact on the 
Roman Empire); SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 89–90 (Marcus Dods trans., 
2009) (attributing decline to gods). See generally PETER HEATHER, THE FALL OF THE 
ROMAN EMPIRE: A NEW HISTORY (2005) (attributing decline to barbarian invasions); A. 
TREVOR HODGE, ROMAN AQUEDUCTS & WATER SUPPLY (2002) (discussing water supply 
in the Roman Empire). 
82. For more on the “decline school,” see Robert D. Schulzinger, Complaints, Self-
Justifications, and Analysis: The Historiography of American Relations since 1996, in AMERICA 
IN THE WORLD: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1941, at 
395, 421–23; and see Peter Schmeisser, Taking Stock: Is America in Decline?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Apr. 17, 1988, at 24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 1988/04/ 17/ 
 magazine/taking-stock-is-america-in-decline.html? pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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will increasingly govern through their White House staff of 
superloyalists, issuing executive orders that their staffers will 
impose on the federal bureaucracy even when they conflict 
with congressional mandates; (4) they will engage with an 
increasingly politicized military in ways that may greatly 
expand their effective power to put their executive orders 
into force throughout the nation; (5) they will legitimate 
their unilateral actions through an expansive use of 
emergency powers, and (6) assert “mandates from the 
People” to evade or ignore congressional statutes when 
public opinion polls support decisive action; (7) they will 
rely on elite lawyers in the executive branch to write up 
learned opinions that vindicate the constitutionality of their 
most blatant power grabs. These opinions will publicly 
rubber-stamp presidential actions months or years before 
the Supreme Court gets into the act . . . [w]ith . . . the 
president’s media machine generating a groundswell of 
support for his power grab, the Supreme Court may find it 
prudent to stage a strategic retreat, allowing the president to 
displace Congress and use his bureaucracy and military 
authority to establish a new regime of law and order.83 
This is his outline and argument. In short, Ackerman predicts 
an executive coup made possible by a politicized and anti-
democratic military. 
While he assembles an argument that explains some serious 
problems, his conclusions sometimes seem over-reaching. 
Ackerman reads widely and frequently spots subterranean 
trends before others; but in this instance he may have over-
learned the lessons from his principle case study. Ackerman 
rests his argument on the lessons he draws from three recent 
crises in the recent American constitutional experience: 
Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the so-called “War on Terror.” And 
while Ackerman refers to the Watergate and Iran-Contra 
episodes throughout this book, it appears that he would not 
have written it absent the outrageous “Torture Memos” issued 
by the US Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in the 
summer of 2002.84 Ackerman hangs his argument on the claim 
                                                                                                                         
83. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 9–10. 
84. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (compiling the legal memoranda that appear 
to justify torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees). 
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that the “‘torture memos’ do not represent a momentary 
aberration but a symptom of deep structural pathologies that 
portend worse abuses in the future.”85 
With the “Torture Memos” as his principal source of 
inspiration, Ackerman ascribes the loss of republican values to 
the “transformation of the White House into a platform for 
charismatic extremism and bureaucratic lawlessness.” 86 
Ackerman does not foresee a decline in the nation’s morality or 
its democratic processes. He expects America to continue to 
develop into a more moral nation and to continue to hold 
regular elections. He does, however, predict that the duly-
elected presidents will govern radically and without adequate 
checks from Congress or the judiciary.87 In Ackerman’s dark 
interpretation of the emerging “administrative Presidency,” the 
United States will come to be governed through a largely 
unaccountable executive branch.88 Presidents will set policy by 
edict and implement it through the burgeoning White House 
staff rather than through the executive departments or agencies. 
These untethered presidents will determine policy on their own 
or through czars who have not faced the confirmation process. 
They will establish the policies through decrees, executive 
                                                                                                                         
85. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 95. Trevor Morrison, who served as an associate 
White House counsel to President Obama, takes on this claim directly as part of his 
review, arguing that Ackerman misconstrues institutional realities that generally do 
constrain executive behavior. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1693 (2011) (book review) (“[Ackerman’s] account of the current 
state of affairs is too often oversimplified or false, its attraction to institutional 
innovation too often blind to the workaday needs of government and insensitive to the 
costs of change. Ultimately, the book deals too little with the reality of executive 
constitutionalism to offer a credible appraisal of its performance or to propose serious 
ideas for its reform.”). 
86. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 11. 
87. Id. at 40. 
88. Ackerman cites extensively to the writings of Elena Kagan, who pointedly 
describes this emerging phenomenon as the “administrative Presidency.” See id. at 36–
38. Ackerman notes that Kagan played a key role in developing this form of governance 
while serving in the White House under President Bill Clinton. See id. As a professor at 
Harvard Law School, she became one of its leading theorists. Kagan’s most notable 
scholarly work acknowledged the dangers of this shift: “lawlessness—that Presidents, 
more than agency officials acting independently, tend to push the envelope when 
interpreting statutes.” Id. at 37 (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, Ackerman 
also notes that Kagan concluded that the disadvantages of this lawlessness “are 
outweighed by the “president’s unique claims to democratic legitimacy.” Id.  
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orders, executive agreements, administrative rules, 
interpretations, or signing statements. “Superloyalist” lawyers in 
the Offices of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department or the 
White House Counsel will provide self-proving legal support for 
these policies. Pollsters and spin masters will hone the public 
messages. Thousands of political appointees will implement 
them. 89  The presidents will enjoy the tacit consent of a 
fragmented Congress and an excessively deferential judiciary. 
And, in each of Ackerman’s scenarios, the military plays a 
critical role. In the direst of these, “the military will operate as a 
power behind the throne.”90 
One of Ackerman’s most compelling concerns is the 
increasingly politicized and autonomous military.91 This three-
part argument notes that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has 
become an unelected political force of its own. Second, this 
“military colonization” over national security decision making 
has been enhanced by the ever-increasing number of officers 
and retired officers gaining civilian appointments. Finally—and 
possibly fatally—these two phenomena have been significantly 
aggravated because military professionals have become far more 
political and partisan. In short, Ackerman posits that the officer 
corps, who over time have increasingly identified with the 
Republican party, may resolve some future political crisis by 
handing the presidency to the Republican candidate on the 
basis that to do so would prevent a security catastrophe.92 
First, Ackerman explains that since the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has enjoyed an 
increasingly autonomous and powerful status as the unified 
voice of the armed forces.93 Charismatic chairmen, such as Colin 
Powell and Michael Mullen, have been able to pursue policy 
                                                                                                                         
89. Ackerman points out that President John F. Kennedy had 196 high level 
positions to fill, each requiring US Senate confirmation. President Clinton had 786, 
and President George W. Bush had 1141. When combined with the key posts that do 
not require confirmation, the current president can make some 3000 key 
appointments. Id. at 34. 
90. Id. at 11. 
91. See generally id. ch. 2. 
92. Id. at 61–62, 78–79. 
93. Id. at 49; see Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, 10 U.S.C. §§ 151–56 (2006). 
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objectives by appealing directly to the public, to House or 
Senate leadership, and the executive. Doing this, they have 
sometimes outmaneuvered their civilian defense secretaries and 
even presidents in contests to shape military policy. 94  Most 
notably, Ackerman explains that General Powell foisted on 
President Clinton his eponymous doctrine, limiting 
interventions to circumstances in which the United States could 
exert overwhelming force.95 
Second, Ackerman argues that career officers have 
colonized the key positions of nominally civilian leadership of 
military and paramilitary institutions, in the Department of 
Defense, the National Security Council (“NSC”), and the 
Intelligence Community. Prior to 1980, the civilian leadership 
within the Department of Defense was overwhelmingly non-
military; only seventeen percent had as much as five years of 
military service. 96  Since 1980, the numbers have changed 
considerably. Nearly a quarter have had fifteen years of service, 
and forty-four percent had five years. 97  Why is this shift 
problematic? First, having spent so much time in military 
careers, they are imbued with military culture and military views. 
These are not wrong or inferior, but they are frequently 
different from the civilian perspectives that are supposed to be 
informing their work in civilian billets. Likewise, those with a 
military background may have bureaucratic advantages—for 
instance in communicating with people in uniform in ways that 
enable them to connect better—that give them a bureaucratic-
operational advantage over true civilians, particularly in an era 
where the civilian appointments turn over so rapidly and take so 
long to fill.98 
                                                                                                                         
94. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 49–56. 
95. See id. at 51, 56 . 
96. Id. at 56–57. 
97. Id. at 57. 
98. According to the most recent data available, the average political appointee 
faces a confirmation process that takes eight-and-a-half months and then serves only 
eleven to twenty months. CHERYL Y. MARKUM ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST., 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS: POSITIONS AND PROCESS xi (2001). 
Ackerman notes that between 1979 and 2003, positions requiring Senate confirmation 
were vacant some twenty-five percent of the time. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 157 
(citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82. 
S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 962–63 (2009)). 
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Ackerman also notes with concern the significant increase 
in the incidence of military professionals leading non-military 
institutions such as the NSC and intelligence agencies.99 For four 
decades following the establishment of the post in 1947, civilians 
served as national security advisor. Particularly in the years 
following President Kennedy’s appointment of McGeorge 
Bundy, heavyweights such as Walt W. Rostow, Henry Kissinger, 
and Zbigniew Brzezinski provided meaningful civilian control of 
the national security establishment. Ackerman further asserts 
that Ronald Reagan’s unfortunate appointments of Marine 
Colonel Robert “Bud” McFarlane and Vice Admiral John 
Poindexter resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal. He cites Ivo 
Daalder and I.M. Destler who note that Reagan’s preferred 
choice, James A. Baker, would probably have exercised the 
common sense and the administrative skill needed to avoid the 
fiasco.100 Even after the scandal threatened to bring down his 
administration, Reagan turned to another officer, Colin Powell, 
and, likewise, George H.W. Bush appointed Army Lieutenant 
General Brent Scowcroft. The trend has only continued to 
intensify, as presidents have since appointed career officers to 
chair the NSC,101 to key posts in the CIA,102 and, more recently, 
to serve as directors of national intelligence.103 Ackerman makes 
this point powerfully: 
                                                                                                                         
99. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 57–58.  
100. See id. at 57 (citing IVO DAALDER & I.M. DESTLER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
OVAL OFFICE: PROFILES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS AND THE PRESIDENTS 
THEY SERVED—FROM JFK TO GEORGE W. BUSH 148–49 (2009)). 
101. Ackerman may be overstating his case as far as the office of the National 
Security Advisor. Brent Scowcroft was the last military appointee for sixteen years, as 
neither Presidents Clinton nor George W. Bush appointed officers or former officers. 
President Obama’s first appointee, retired Marine general James L. Jones, lasted well 
less than two years and was replaced by a civilian lawyer with no military background, 
Thomas E. Donilon. See id. at 57–58.  
102. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama appointed two directors of the 
Central Intelligence Agency; notably each appointed one civilian and one active-duty 
general. President George W. Bush appointed civilian Porter Goss and General Michael 
Hayden, US Air Force (Ret.), while President Obama appointed civilian Leon Panetta 
and General David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.). 
103 . The directors of national intelligence have been: Ambassador John 
Negroponte (Apr. 21, 2005–Feb. 13, 2007), Vice Admiral John Michael McConnell, US 
Navy (Ret.) (Feb. 13, 2007–Jan. 27, 2009), Admiral Dennis C. Blair, US Navy (Ret.) 
(Jan. 28, 2009–May 28, 2010), David C. Gompert (a Naval Academy graduate and long-
time civilian employee of the Department of Defense, Acting, May 28, 2010–Aug. 5, 
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A similar pattern prevails at the Defense Department. Its 
recent decision to create an undersecretary of defense for 
intelligence is a big deal—the new office ranks just behind 
the reliably civilian undersecretary [sic] in the department’s 
pecking order. But only the first incumbent was a civilian 
[Stephen Cambone], and he has been followed by a retired 
three-star general [James Clapper, US Air Force]. If this 
military turn continues, the undersecretary will not function 
as a civilian check on the enormous intelligence operations 
run by the department’s Defense Intelligence Agency or its 
National Security Agency—both under the leadership of 
active-duty three-stars. He will be looking at the world 
through the same professional prisms as his subordinates. 
When he leaves the Pentagon to talk with the president’s 
new director of national intelligence [Admiral Dennis 
Blair], the conversation will continue in the same vein—so 
long as the director is a military man, one retired three-star 
general will be talking to another retired three-star. And if 
they get together to give the president advice, he 
undoubtedly will want to hear the opinion of his four-star 
national security advisor [Retired Marine Corps General 
James L. Jones].104 
Ackerman’s point here is very important: the nation does 
not have meaningful civilian control over the military 
intelligence apparatus if its civilian leaders are retired 
generals. 105  Even though the overwhelming majority of 
intelligence activities, personnel, and funding are military, the 
intelligence process remains an inherently political activity and 
therefore needs civilian input. 106  Relying on a relatively 
homogeneous military community to lead intelligence activities 
deprives decision makers of other valuable perspectives. 
                                                                                                                         
2010), and Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, US Air Force (Ret.) (Aug. 5, 2010–
present). 
104. Id., at 58–59 (citations omitted). The “sic” indicates that the Under Secretary 
for Intelligence follows in succession order to the reliably civilian Deputy Secretary (not 
“undersecretary”). 
105. See id. at 59. 
106 . See Robert Jervis, What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?, 1 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 28, 39–41 (1986); see also, e.g., Mark R. 
Shulman, The Rise and Fall of American Naval Intelligence, 1882-1917, 8 INTELLIGENCE & 
NAT’L SEC. 214 (1993) (providing a historical perspective on the politicization of the 
collection and analysis work of the Office of Naval Intelligence). 
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Ackerman’s snapshot may not be quite as predictive as he 
fears. In the year since Ackerman wrote this passage, President 
Obama has appointed civilians to succeed military men in the 
positions of under secretary of defense for intelligence (Michael 
Vickers) and national security advisor (Thomas E. Donilon).107 
Today, only one of the top fifteen people on the NSC staff has 
significant military experience. Moreover, command 
responsibilities continue to require that the directors of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency 
are general officers, indicating that Congress has deemed 
appointment of officers to these positions as necessary for the 
agencies’ success. 108  Likewise, Ackerman found “fourteen of 
twenty-nine key positions” in the Obama Defense Department 
were held by retired officers.109 My own survey (approximately a 
year later) finds fifteen of ninety-two appointments at the level 
of deputy assistant secretary or above were held by retired 
military. Of these fifteen retired officers, more than half direct 
units administering personnel or military community and family 
affairs (including reserve and prisoner of war affairs), for which 
the leadership of veterans seems uniquely appropriate. Likewise, 
the service departments of the army, navy, and air force do have 
a higher proportion of senior administrators with significant 
military experience, which also makes good sense given their 
mission to organize, train, and equip military personnel. On the 
other hand, citizens dominate in the Department of Defense’s 
strategy and policy positions.  
                                                                                                                         
107. Under Secretary Vickers did have some military experience early in his 
career, but he quickly moved to the Central Intelligence Agency and then other civilian 
positions. Moreover, the president traditionally does not appoint civilians to some of 
these positions. The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency is a general officer, 
with duties to serve as military intelligence advisor to the secretary and the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs and to command the Joint Functional Component Command for 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5(b)(5) (2006); see also 
About DIA, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, http://www.dia.mil/about/ (last updated 
Jan. 6, 2012). Likewise, Congress requires that the director of the National Security 
Agency be recommended jointly by the secretary of defense and the director of 
national intelligence before being appointed by the president. 10 U.S.C. § 201 (2006 & 
Supp. 2009). He also serves as commander of the US Cyber Command. Apparently, his 
deputy is always a civilian. See Who Is the Head of NSA/CSS?, Frequently Asked Questions 
About NSA, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY-CENT. SEC. SERVICE, http://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/
about_nsa.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
108. 10 U.S.C. § 201. 
109. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 162. 
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Over the past several decades, in addition to taking on new 
and more politically oriented roles in the government, 
individual officers have become more politicized and partisan. 
First of all, they vote. Prior to World War II, “[t]he 
overwhelming majority of officers even refused to vote, since it 
required them to think of themselves as partisans for the time it 
took to cast a secret ballot.”110 By 1944, however, a quarter of 
senior officers voted in the presidential election.111 Since then, 
political participation became common. The Reagan Revolution 
brought another dramatic change. In the late seventies, over 
half of all higher ranking officers identified themselves as 
political independents and only a third as Republicans.112 In 
1984, over half self-identified as Republicans, a portion that rose 
to two-thirds in 1996—at which point only seven percent were 
Democrats. 113  Mazur also notes the increasing levels of 
partisanship, citing as support a statement made by a West Point 
professor and a speech given by Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates at the Air Force and Naval Academy graduations in 
2007.114 And because the current officer corps is also more likely 
than not to believe it acceptable to advocate publicly for specific 
military policies,115 civilian control is weakened—particularly if 
the civilian is a Democrat. 
Ackerman discusses possible implications having an officer 
corps that overwhelmingly favors one party over another. Here 
                                                                                                                         
110. Id. at 61. 
111. Id. (referring to colonels and general officers). 
112 . Id. (citing that fifty five percent of higher ranking officers identified 
themselves as independents in 1976, while thirty three percent identified as 
Republican). 
113. Id. Reading the same materials, Mazur notes that the author of the survey 
believed that his data “may have understated the size of the partisan divide.” MAZUR, 
supra note 17, at 86. 
114. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 83. Ackerman cites a survey taken at West Point. 
Ackerman, supra note 75, at 62. 
115. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 62 (citing Ole R. Holsti, Of Chasms and 
Convergences, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAPS AND AMERICAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY 15, 19-21 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) 
(reporting on survey conducted by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies); James A. 
David, Attitudes and Opinions Among Senior Military Officers and a U.S. Cross-Section, 1998-
99, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAPS AND AMERICAN NATIONAL 
SECURITY 120 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001)) (“[Sixty-five] percent of 
senior officers think it is OK to go public and advocate military policies they ‘believe 
are in the best interests of the United States . . . .’”). 
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he echoes Gibbon’s account of the fall of Rome. He identifies 
several hypothetical scenarios in which the constitutional order 
faces critical but not unthinkable challenges. One scenario 
involves highly contested election à la Bush v. Gore in which the 
Supreme Court demurs to decide this “political question,” even 
as the crisis continues past inauguration day (much as it 
threatened to do in 1876–77 and again in 2000).116 Finally, the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs steps in and “calls a halt to these 
shenanigans in the name of national security.”117 He declares 
the Republican to be the winner, based on his reading of polling 
data (not based on votes in the Electoral College) through 
which he finds the Republican candidate to be more popular. 
Ackerman does not seem as exorcised by this hypothetical 
intervention itself as he is by the dangerous precedent it sets for 
further military meddling in the constitutional order.118  His 
other hypotheticals also involve some form of military 
participation in their resolution.119 
After painting the lurid crises that impend, Ackerman 
proposes a variety of clever institutional solutions to ensure that 
the White House and the military reconnect more faithfully with 
the constitutional order that has sustained the republic for over 
two centuries. First, he proposes a raft of arrangements to 
improve the functioning of the democratic process. To reduce 
the likelihood of electing demagogues to the presidency, he 
revives his proposal for a national “Deliberation Day.”120 To 
ensure that serious journalists continue to perform watchdog 
functions, he would create the “Internet news voucher” and a 
“National Endowment for Journalism.”121 And to avoid another 
contested electoral crisis, Ackerman supports the Popular 
Sovereignty Initiative, an interstate pact in which states commit 
                                                                                                                         
116. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 76–78; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
117. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 79. 
118. Id. at 78–79. 
119. See Ackerman discusses two additional scenarios as well: “The Extremist 
Scenario” and “The Crisis Scenario.” See id. at 79–81, 81–83. 
120 . See id. at 127–31. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, 
DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
121. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 133 (giving shared credit to his colleague 
Ian Ayres for the idea of the “Internet news voucher”). 
2012]CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 439 
their Electoral College votes to whichever candidate earns the 
most popular votes.122 
Then Ackerman offers a more radical set of organizational 
adjustments intended to halt the march of the “institutional 
presidency” and restore the rule of law. First, Ackerman would 
establish a Supreme Executive Tribunal composed of nine 
judges appointed to long staggered terms and subject to US 
Senate confirmation.123 This tribunal would review the legal 
opinions made by the White House counsel and the Office of 
Legal Counsel in an effort to hammer out consensual positions 
on questions related to executive authority.124 As part of a grand 
bargain rejiggering the separation of powers among the 
branches of government, Ackerman would also reform the 
Senate’s filibuster rules to ensure that appointments receive up 
or down votes.125 
Among Ackerman’s many reforms, and most important for 
our purposes, is the proposal to draft and adopt a new Canon of 
Military Ethics, aimed at reinvigorating the principle of civilian 
control.126 Ackerman hopes that a presidential commission on 
civil-military relations would undertake several years of study to 
shape a realistic code of conduct. Once drafted, Congress would 
enact it or the president could order it put into effect.127 As 
creative and thorough as Ackerman is, this proposal seems 
facile. The principle of civilian control of the military is clearly 
important and relatively noncontroversial as far as principles go, 
but what does it mean? Ackerman punts this question to the 
presidential commission. 
To support this change in culture, Ackerman does, 
however, offer a few more concrete proposals. He would 
implement a new emergency powers law that requires increased 
levels of congressional support as security crises continue.128 He 
would amend the Goldwater-Nichols legislation so that the 
                                                                                                                         
122. See id. at 136–37. 
123. See id. at 143. 
124. See id. at 143–46. 
125. See id. at 158–59. 
126. See id. at 159–60. 
127. See id. at 160–61. 
128. See id. at 168–74. Here Ackerman reprises his 2006 book, Before the Next 
Attack. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).  
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chairman of the Joint Chiefs no longer has a statutory seat on 
the NSC; he or she would attend meetings only at the invitation 
of the secretary of defense or the president.129 Ackerman would 
extend civilian experience requirements beyond the top 
echelons of the Defense Department. Currently, the secretary 
and deputy secretary of defense must spend, respectively, ten 
and seven years as civilians before they can be appointed.130 The 
service secretaries must spend at least five years as civilians.131 
The under secretary of defense for policy must also come from 
civilian life, although no specific time requirement is imposed.132 
Ackerman would extend this mechanism more broadly within 
the Department of Defense and to the national security advisor 
and director of national intelligence. 
While I applaud the effort to encourage presidents to reach 
beyond the military to find their civilian leaders, this particular 
fix seems somewhat ill-fitting. After twenty or thirty in the 
military, individuals are not likely to dramatically change their 
mindsets by spending five years working for a defense contractor 
or doing defense related work in academia. And if they have 
been working in a field completely unrelated to the military, 
their relevant skills and interest in military affairs may have 
diminished significantly. At the risk of being one of those 
reviewers who writes about what he would include in the book 
rather than take the author’s argument seriously, I wish that 
Ackerman had instead focused some attention on influential 
educational and civic institutions and what they could do to 
educate future military and civilian leaders to make wiser 
decisions.133 As these institutions invest more in this kind of 
education, their graduates seem more likely to receive 
leadership appointments—and to fulfill their roles wisely. 
                                                                                                                         
129. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 163–64. 
130. 10 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 132(a) (2006) (applying to the secretary of defense and 
deputy secretary, respectively).  
131. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8013(a)(2), 3013(a)(2), 5013(a)(2) (2006) (referring to the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy, respectively).  
132. 10 U.S.C. §§ 134(a), 135(a), 136(a) (2006). 
133. See, e.g., David Burt, Faculty Approve New ROTC Resolutions, YALE DAILY NEWS, 
May 5, 2011, http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/may/05/faculty-approve-new-
rotc-resolutions/; The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and Studies in Grand 
Strategy Graduate Seminar, YALE UNIV., http://iss.yale.edu/brady-johnson-program-
grand-strategy-and-studies-grand-strategy-graduate-seminar (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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III. WHAT KIND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP DO WE 
WANT? 
These two important books raise troubling questions about 
the relationship between America’s armed forces and wider 
society. Both point to the isolation of the military and discuss 
the significant risks that isolation creates, but neither goes far 
enough in examining what we should expect from that 
relationship. In general terms, the wish list has not changed in 
decades. First, military officers should do what they are directed 
to do by the national command authority in legitimate pursuit 
of national security and related objectives. Second, military 
personnel should act publicly in a politically neutral way. Third, 
the armed forces should be reasonably equipped and adequately 
trained to complete their assigned tasks. And fourth, their 
leaders should provide civilian leadership with the information 
needed to administer effective and meaningful command. 
These axioms remain valid as far as they go, but, as Mazur and 
Ackerman observe, much else has changed. Mazur focuses on 
the military culture, which has evolved dramatically since the 
end of the draft, mostly in ways that further removed it from 
wider society. Ackerman focuses on changes in the 
constitutional order—in our polity—that portend for the 
military a new role as power broker. Both authors offer some 
laudable suggestions for how to improve the relationship 
between the military and civil society. 
The end of the draft and the rise of the modern military-
industry inevitably changed the range of possibilities for civil-
military relations. A generation of a volunteer military has 
supplanted the nation’s long history of, and attachment to, 
citizen soldiers. The implications of this change for the nation 
are myriad. For example, the military is composed of a less 
representative sample of Americans. In contrast, American 
society is composed of an ever smaller portion of people with 
military experience. This has led to a growing gap in 
understanding between the military and civil sectors. Likewise, 
fewer of our elected leaders have military service experience, 
which would give them personal insight into war and the 
military, and the credibility to make decisions contrary to the 
advice of military professionals. 
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Half a century ago, outgoing President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower presciently warned against the distractions imposed 
by the military-industrial complex on the “diligent in pursuit of 
the Nation’s great goals.”134 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or 
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential 
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will 
persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger 
our liberties or democratic processes. We should take 
nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable 
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge 
industrial and military machinery of defense with our 
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may 
prosper together.135 
Despite Eisenhower’s admonitions, the cluster of interests 
representing members of Congress and their financial 
supporters, the military services, universities and think-tanks, 
and the defense industries has dramatically reshaped the 
nation’s political, research, economic, and strategic landscapes. 
And I see no way to unravel that complex as long as the military 
needs specialized weapons, logistics, and communications 
systems. Therefore, we need more sophisticated tools and 
theories for controlling them and managing the conflicts of 
interest. 
Yes, domestic factors and the choices leaders make do 
matter a great deal. In the tradition of historians Edward 
Gibbon and Paul Kennedy, Bruce Ackerman and Diane Mazur 
offer explanations of the decline of civil-military relations that 
rely on these kinds of endogenous factors. For a more complete 
and possibly more problematic understanding, however, we 
should also examine the exogenous factors that contribute to 
reshaping the relationships between the armed forces and 
general society. In great part, civil-military relations have 
changed because of the end of the Cold War, the new ubiquity 
                                                                                                                         
134. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), in PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1961, at 1035–40 (1961), available 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp. 
135. Id. 
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of information technology revolution, and the rise in 
importance of nonstate actors, most notably of Al Qaeda. 
First, since the end of the Cold War released state and 
nonstate actors from the constraints of the superpower rivalry, 
conflict has proliferated. As a result, the United States has 
experienced a militarization of foreign relations. The increased 
resources invested in diplomacy, public diplomacy, and 
nonmilitary foreign aid pale in comparison to the proliferation 
of Defense Department relations with foreign governments, the 
influence of Regional Combatant Commands, and the impact of 
military assistance programs. 136  Even without wartime 
supplemental financing, the Defense Department budget is over 
thirty times greater than that of the State Department.137 The 
Department of Defense has approximately 1,400,000 service 
members on Active Duty, 860,000 Reserve and National Guard, 
and 790,000 civilians on installations in the United States and 
around the world.138 The Department of State has approximately 
29,000 employees.139 With far greater resources than the State 
Department spread out over far-flung locations, the Department 
of Defense plays ever greater roles in US foreign relations. And 
many of the changes blur the lines between roles and missions 
traditionally deemed military and those viewed as diplomatic or 
political. 
Second, the Information Revolution is constantly blurring 
the lines between civil and military capacities, issues, and 
campaigns. Cyber threats and cyber warfare can be conducted 
by military or civilian authorities and against states, nonstate 
entities, or individuals. Likewise, unmanned aerial vehicles are 
being operated by military and nonmilitary organizations, often 
with operationally indistinguishable missions. Global 
information systems and highly flexible drones erase many of 
the distinctions between the military and civilian spheres. These 
                                                                                                                         
136. The 2011 fiscal year budget for the Department of State was US$16.4 billion 
(excluding foreign assistance), while the budget for the Department of Defense was 
US$548.9 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2010).  
137. See id.  
138. US DEP’T OF DEFENSE, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 8–9 (2010). 
139. US DEP’T OF STATE, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 7–8 (2010). 
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new technologies irrevocably blur the lines between war and 
peace. 
The war against Al Qaeda has rapidly accelerated the 
breakdown between civil and military spheres because the US 
has been fighting a “war” with a nonstate actor. The National 
Command Authority is constantly deciding whether to employ 
military or civilian assets in combating Al Qaeda. For example, 
the president of the United States now possesses dramatically 
expanded powers to order the killing of an individual outside a 
traditional war zone. The law has been hard pressed to keep up 
with these developments. The nature of the enemy (nonstate, 
transnational), the tools available (weapons, cyber-media, 
diplomacy, public affairs), and the laws and norms applicable 
(humanitarian, human rights, domestic, privacy, and secrecy 
laws) all shape the landscape in ways that inevitably alter civil-
military relations. If this is emblematic of an epoch in which 
sovereignty itself is in decline, then it will not be repaired with 
the demise of Al Qaeda. 
Diane Mazur and Bruce Ackerman’s new books make 
important contributions, reminding us that the relationship 
between civil society and the military matter for the nation’s 
security and governance. These relationships do not inevitably 
emerge from some natural concepts of war and peace or 
categories of civilian and military, let alone from immutable 
principles defining their interrelationships. 140  We must 
constantly evaluate these relationships to preserve essential 
values in the face of revolutionary change. The decisions made 
by public authorities, such as Justice Rehnquist or President 
Obama, have tremendous and sometimes unseen significance. 
So too, do global trends far beyond their control. Perhaps the 
most valuable contribution Professors Mazur and Ackerman 
make is to reframe and restart a national discussion about the 
relationship between our national security apparatus and our 
republic. 
                                                                                                                         
140. See MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 1 (Yale Univ. Press 2000) (2000) (quoting Sir Henry Maine’s 
observation that “[w]ar “appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern 
invention”). 
